FAKE BANK SUPERVISION
REAL BONUS MONEY TO THE EXECS THAT THEY GET TO KEEP
REAL FRAUD PAY BACK BY THE SHARE HOLDERS.
How could something so staggeringly widespread and so blatantly corrupt have happened in the first place?
What, exactly, does an actual risk manager at Wells Fargo do?
“What does this indicate about the bank’s underwriting policies? Can anyone have a Wells credit card without any checks being made concerning that person’s ability to make payments for debt created using this card?” And what does this say about the information the company has reported to investors and regulators?
When politicians talk about Wall Street as a “criminal enterprise,” this is exactly what they are talking about.
Pervasive Sham Deals at Wells Fargo, and No One Noticed?
5,300 of his employees — let me repeat that number because it is so mind-bogglingly large: 5,300 — were engaged in rampant sham deals, secretly signing up myriad customers for two million accounts that they did not authorize, did not know they had, did not need, and clearly did not understand. Wells Fargo then charged customers at least $1.5 million in fees for those unwanted sham accounts, which were created simply to goose the income of bank employees whose incentive programs rewarded them for opening as many new accounts as possible. Some of the accounts were closed right away, as soon as the employee got credit for them. The executive who oversaw this group of rogue employees, Carrie Tolstedt, conveniently announced plans to retire over the summer and, according to Fortune, is being paid $124.6 million on the way out. (One analyst has called for a clawback of that exit package.)